Resolution No. 7198i
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RESOLUTION NO, 7198
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
VERNON APPROVING AND ADOPTING THE CITY OF VERNON
WATER DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN, A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE CITY OF VERNON EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS PLAN, DATED JULY 22, 1998
WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Vernon
previously created the Vernon Disaster Council by enacting
Ordinance No. 897 in April, 1980; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Ordinance No. 897
set forth in Chapter 8 of the Vernon City Code and Section 8.10,
the Vernon Disaster Council developed an emergency plan which was
approved and adopted by Resolution No. 6326 on September 21, 1993,
entitled the "Multi -Hazard Functional Plan"; and
WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Vernonapproved
and adopted an amendment to the Multi -Hazard Functional Plan by
Resolution No. 6393 on February 22, 1994; and
WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Vernon approved
and adopted a Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS)
Multi -Hazard Functional Plan by Resolution No. 6961 on May 20,
1997; and
WHEREAS, the City of Vernon desires to supplement the
existing Emergency Operations Plan by developing a comprehensive
Water Department Emergency Management Plan that outlines (i)
various hazards that could affect the water system and (ii)
mitigation measures designed to reduce the risks associated with
these hazards; and
WHEREAS, said proposed Water Department Emergency
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Management Plan includes several items that involve capital
expenditures which will be phased in over a period of several
years keeping most expenditures within the normal routine
maintenance budget; and
WHEREAS, Bruce V. Malkenhorst, City Clerk, by letter
dated July 28, 1998, recommended that the Water Department
Emergency Management Plan be approved and implemented to the
fullest extent possible.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF VERNON AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1: The City Council of the City of Vernon does
hereby find and determine that the recitals contained hereinabove-
are true and correct.
SECTION 2: The City Council of the City of Vernon hereby
approves and adopts the City of Vernon Water Department Emergency
Management Plan, a Supplement to the City of Vernon Emergency
Operations Plan, dated July 22, 1998, which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A," and presented to the City Council concurrently with
this resolution, and the City Council hereby orders said Plan to
be received and filed by the City Clerk.
SECTION 3: The City Council of the City of Vernon hereby
authorizes the City Clerk to notify the proper parties that the
City of Vernon has approved and adopted said Plan and to deliver
whatever documentation is necessary to said parties to implement
said Plan.
SECTION 4: The City Clerk of the City of Vernon shall
certify to the passage of this resolution and thereupon and
thereafter the same shall be in full force and effect.
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APPROVED AND ADOPTED this 4th day of August, 1998.
EONIS C. MAL URG, Ma or
ATTEST
BRUCE V. MALKENHORST, City Clerk
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )
I, BRUCE V. MALKENHORST, City Clerk of the City of
Vernon, do hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution, being
Resolution No. 7198, was duly adopted by the City Council of the
City of Vernon at a regular meeting of the City Council duly held
on Tuesday, August 4, 1998, and thereafter was duly signed by the
Mayor of the City of Vernon. /J
(SEAL)
a
BRUCE V. MALKENHORST, City Clerk
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CITY OF VERNON
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT PLAN
A SUPPLEMENT TO THE CITY OF VERNON
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN
Samuel Kevin Wilson, P.E.
Director of Community Services and Water
Prepared by:
Tam Kennedy
July 22,1998
Exhibit "A'
ni
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION ......... .................. ......1
MITIGATION ............. ..... ................ ............... ..3
System Description ................................................ 3
Sources: Groundwater ........... ............. ... .... 3
Sources; Surface Water ...................................... 5
Storage and Pumping Plants: Tanks ........................... 5
Storage and Pumping Plants: Boosters ...... .. .............. 6
Distribution System ........................ ....... ..... 6
HAZARD ASSESSMENT ....................................................... 8
Earthquakes ...................... ..................... ......8
Hurricanes.................................... .......... ....9
Tornadoes................................................9
Floods.... ...................................................9
Tsunamis.......................................................10
Riots, Vandalism, and Civil Disorder ....................... 10
Nuclear Weapons Effects ........ ...... ..... ...... 11
Additional Hazards .............................. .. ........ 11
Loss of Electrical Power .................................... I I
Communication System Failure .............................. 12
COMPONENT VULNERABILITY ............................................ 13
Wells..... ............. ...................... .13
Pumping Plants and Reservoirs .................................... 15
HAZARD MITIGATION .......................................... .... 18
The Cost Benefits of Mitigation .................................... 18
Wells.................................. ...................19
Boosters..... ................................................... 19
Reservoirs................................................ .19
Distribution .................... 20
Backup Power ................................. ....... .20
Communications................................................21
All Facilities ............................... ....................21
Exhibit "A"
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ..................................... 22
Main Break Response ..................... ........ ................. 22
Water Facilities Damage Assessment ...................................... 23
Emergency Supply Vendor List .......................................... 23
RECOVERY .......... .............................. ..........24
Temporary Emergency Water Supply .................... • ................ 24
BoilWater Orders ......................... ................. .....25
LargeWater Users ..................................................... 25
APPENDICES
Exhibit "A"
CITY OF VERNON WATER DEPARTMENT
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The City of Vernon has in place an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). The EOP describes the
organization of emergency response and some specific response guidelines. The EOP does not
address hazard mitigation or recovery from an emergency. The City of Vernon Water Department
Emergency Management Plan (EMP) is designed to fill the gap and identify methods to mitigate
hazards before an emergency and mechanisms to speed recovery after an emergency.
The EMP addresses all of the major hazards identified by the American Water Works Association
as well as power failures and communications breakdowns. The EMP assesses the relative
vulnerability of all facilities and prescribes mitigation measures designed to eliminate these
vulnerabilities.
A series of mitigation steps have been proposed, with the major items being itemized below:
1. Installation of flexible couplings at piping connections at wells and tanks that are subject to
breakage during earthquakes.
2. Providing back up power generators at several well sites and at Pumping Plant One (behind
City Hall) so that water can be pumped in the event of a extended power failure.
3. Having seismic assessments performed to assess the ability of tanks and other structures to
withstand earthquakes. Many of these structures were constructed well before modern
earthquake codes and may need additional structural elements.
4. Improving the communication system to provide clear and immediate communications
between personnel during emergency responses. The current system breaks down
completely in emergencies.
5. Improving the capability of crews to effectively isolate, repair, and disinfect damaged water
mains. This is designed to reduce the length of time that water service is disrupted after an
earthquake or similar emergency.
There are several other smaller measures that are recommended. The total cost of the mitigation
measures, excluding the back up generators, should be something that can be absorbed into the
Water Department's routine maintenance costs. The generator sets cost about $50,000.00 each and
should be budgeted as capital improvements over the next few years.
The general assessment of the water department facilities is that while they were constructed well,
there are some simple improvements that could be made that should provide a higher probability of
surviving a major earthquake or other emergency. Since the reliability of the water system is the
paramount concern for fire safety and sanitation, these mitigation measures are a small price to pay
in order to safeguard the community of Vernon. The potential costs that a failure of the water
system, both in property damage and lost economic output, are very large in comparison to the cost
of mitigation.
Exhibit "A"
INTRODUCTION
The City of Vernon Water Department supplies water for domestic, industrial, and fire protection
uses to the majority of the properties within the City of Vernon. In the event of an emergency, it is
critical that there is continuity of water service. Fire protection, sanitation, and the ability of
customers to pursue their business objectives are all dependant on the water system. The provision
of a safe and abundant supply of water is the continuing goal of the City of Vernon Water
Department.
There are many hazards that threaten to disrupt the provision of water within the city. Ranging from
natural hazards such as earthquakes, to man-made hazards such as terrorism, it is important to
address how each hazard could affect the ability of the Water Department to fulfill it's goals. This
report will identify as many of these hazards as possible, investigate the potential effects, and
propose mechanisms that could mitigate these hazards.
The term "emergency management" may seem to be an oxymoron, how can one plan and prepare
for what is inherently an unexpected event? It is true that we cannot hope to accurately define the
exact nature of some future emergency. We can, however, make rational assessments of known
hazards and make preparations and plans to deal with these hazards as they arise. While we may not
identify every hazard, we can make plans to deal with those that are likely to occur based on
historical records and the experience of other agencies.
This Emergency Management Plan has four main components: mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery. These four elements are part of the emergency management cycle. This approach
recognizes that emergency management is an ongoing process, not just a knee jerk reaction to a
natural disaster.
The City of Vernon has in place a comprehensive Emergency Operations Plan. Developed using the
Standardized Emergency Management System, this plan provides a complete set of instructions for
all city employees to follow in the event of an emergency. The plan also includes information about
the location and make up of the Emergency Operations Center.
The Emergency Operations Plan, however, - cannot be considered a complete Emergency
Management Plan. There is no reference to either mitigation or recovery in this plan. The plan only
provides detailed information about preparedness and response. This Water Department Emergency
Management Plan is intended to be a complimentary document to the existing Emergency
Operations'Plan.- Nothing in this document should be construed as being intended to replace any
portion of the Emergency Operations Plan. Furthermore, if any portion of this document is in:
conflict with the Emergency Operations Plan, the requirements of the Emergency Operations Plan
shall take precedence.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 1
Exhibit "A"
For this reason, the bulk of this report will be on hazard mitigation. In recent years, mitigation has
come to the forefront of emergency management. Director James Lee Witt of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has identified mitigation as one of the best ways to reduce
the overall impact of emergencies. Careful planning before an emergency strikes can transform a
costly disaster into a routine matter.
In order to properly determine what mitigation steps may be necessary in the City of Vernon Water
Department, a comprehensive assessment of hazards and system vulnerability to these hazards will
be performed. Each component of the water system will be investigated to determine the possible
range of hazards and the degree that these components are vulnerable to the various hazards. The
relative probability of each hazard occurring will be factored into the determination of vulnerability.
Second, a hazard mitigation plan will be created in order to address the deficiencies identified in the
hazard and vulnerability assessment This mitigation plan will include various structural and non
-structural mitigation measures that can be implemented in order to reduce vulnerability to hazards.
A cost benefit analysis will determine if the cost of the mitigation is in line with expected costs if
a failure of any particular component of the system occurs.
The mitigation section of this document will be followed by a few brief suggested enhancements to
the preparedness and response elements of the Emergency Operations Plan. These are intended to
be included in the next revision of the Plan.
Finally, the recovery element of the Emergency Response Plan will identify the steps required to get
the water system back to normal operating status after and emergency. This recovery element will
also describe some temporary measures to be utilized during the span of time from the conclusion
of the response phase and the completion of the recovery phase.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 2
Exhibit "A"
MITIGATION
The determination of system vulnerability and the assessment of hazards cannot be performed unless
the physical characteristics of the entire system are known. The first part of this section will define
the water system and it's components which could be vulnerable to the various hazards that will be
identified. Once the system is defined, the various hazards that could affect the system will be
identified and the relative probability of occurrence will be established. Finally, each component
of the system will be evaluated to determine the relative degree of hazard vulnerability.
System Description
The City of Vernon water system, like all water systems, has three main components. water sources,
water storage and pumping plants, and the water distribution system. Most of the components of
the system are between 30 and 70 years old with selected components being even older. There are
several elements that are of less advanced age such as Wells 19 &20 and some new water mains on
Malburg Way, Seville Ave., and the Farmers Marketplace development on Soto Street. A map of
the city showing the locations of the various components is located in Appendix A.
Sources: Groundwater
The primary source of water for the City of Vernon is groundwater. Ten deep water wells are
located throughout the city. The age, type of pump, and production capacity varies from well to well
as follows;
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 3
Exhibit "A"
Table 1: Well Descriptions
Well
Date Drilled
T e of Pum
Pumps to:
Capacity GP
5
4/25/38
Line Shaft
Reservoir
* 1200
11
5/23/52
Line Shaft
Reservoir
1270
12
11/20/53
Line Shaft
Reservoir
775
14
3/23/62
Line Shaft
System
1570
15
10/27/66
Line Shaft
Reservoir
1530
16
9/19/70
Submersible
Reservoir
1723
17
11/1/70
Line Shaft
Reservoir
1517
18
11/30/58
Submersible
System
1388
19
9/19/88
Line Shaft
System
1466
F27 19/23/88
Line Shaft
System
1540
* & imated -Well 5 is inactive and is being investigated as a candidate for rehabilitation. For the
Purposes of this document, Well 5 will not be considered as a viable source of water.
As the table above indicates, there are two main types of pump designs used: Line Shaft and
Submersible. Line shaft pumps employ a vertical turbine pump which is suspended at a point
sufficiently below the water table to have an abundant supply of water. In Vernon, the average pump
depth is about four hundred feet below the ground surface. A column pipe supports the pump and
conveys the water from the pump to the surface. Inside the column pipe is another pipe which
contains a line shaft which couples the pump to a motor located above ground.
Submersible pumps are similar in many ways to line shaft pumps. They use vertical turbine pumps
suspended by a column pipe to a depth of about 400 feet. The motor, however, is attached to the
bottom of the pump and is submerged along with the pump below the water table. There is no above
ground motor.
The primary advantage of the submersible type pump is efficiency; there is a lot of energy lost to the
shaft and bearings on a line shaft pump. The primary disadvantage of a submersible pump is that
you cannot monitor the motor or repair the motor above ground. Any motor failure will result in the
costly removal of the entire pump assembly.
The table above also differentiates which wells pump to storage tanks and which pump directly to
the system. Well water pumped to storage tanks is held in these tanks until system demand requires
it to be pumped out through booster pumps. The wells that pump directly to the system are operated
only when the system demand can accommodate the amount of water produced by he well.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 4
Exhibit "A"
Sources: Surface Water
The City of Vernon also has the capability of drawing water from the Central Basin Municipal Water
District (CBMWD). CBMWD wholesales water from the Colorado River and the State Water
Project. This water is sold to CBMWD by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(MWD). MWD operates the largest water treatment and distribution system in the state and serves
water to nearly every community in Southern California.
The connection to CBMWD is located near the intersection of Vernon Avenue and Alameda Street.
From there, the transmission line travels east to the City Hall complex. Here, the CBMWD feeder
interconnects with the discharge lines from Pumping Plant Number 1 and is thereafter blended with
groundwater in the city distribution system.
Storage and Pumping Plants; Tanks
There are three main storage areas for water produced by the various wells that pump to storage
tanks. Each of these storage areas has an associated pumping plant that contains booster pumps of
various sizes that pump the water into the system. There is a total of 16 million gallons of storage
capacity (excluding the elevated tank).
At City Hall, what appears to be a two level parking structure is actually the roof of a 10 million
gallon underground storage reservoir. Vertical concrete columns extend through the floor of the
lower parking level into the reservoir. The reservoir is over 40 feet deep at it's deepest point Wells
11 and 16 discharge into this reservoir. A channel from the deepest point connects this reservoir to
the boosters at Pumping Plant One (PP I).
The other two storage areas are located at Pumping Plant Two (PP2) at 4355 Downey Road and
Pumping Plant Three (PP3) at 3375 Fruitland Avenue. These storage areas consist of three one
million gallon steel above ground reservoirs each. These tanks are connected so that the water level
rises and -falls equally in each tank.. The tanks at PP2 receive the water from Wells 12 and 17 while
the tanks at PP3 receive the water from Well 15.
There is one more tank located in the system but it's primary purpose is not for water storage. The
elevated tank located behind Well 14 at 2800 Soto is designed to assist in the regulation of water
pressure in the system. The tank is shaped like a flatted ball with a central vertical hole through it.
It's capacity is 750,000 gallons and it is on legs that elevate it so that the water level is normally
about 170 feet above the ground.
As water is pumped into the system by the various wells and booster pumps, demand from the water
users balances the water coming in. If the demand is lower than the supply, the level of water in the
elevated tank rise; if demand is lower, the level of the tank falls. The large capacity and wide cross
section of the tank means that it takes a lot of water to make a significant rise or fall in the level of
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 5
Exhibit "A"
the water. Since the water pressure is directly dependant on the level of the water, the operators of
the system are not constantly turning pumps on and off. Preset limits of water level trigger action
by the operator to make adjustments in the amount of water pumped into the system.
In this way, the City of Vernon water system is known as an "open" system. System pressure is
dependant on the level of the water in the elevated tank which is "open" to atmospheric pressure on
top. The elevated tank is a critical part of the system for without this tank, water pressure would
quickly fall off if demand exceeded supply. Conversely, without the elevated tank, if supply
exceeded demand, the booster pumps would soon over -pressurize the system resulting in bursting
pipes and faucets throughout the city.
Finally, there are two abandoned 500,000 gallon storage tanks located at Pumping Plant 4 near Well
20 at 4755 District Boulevard. These tanks are seriously degraded and repair costs will exceed
$250000.00. At this time, the limited usefulness of tanks at this location does not justify the
expenditure of the large sum of money required to refurbish them. They will more than likely be
demolished for scrap during FY 98-99.
Storage and Pumping Plants: Boosters
At the three pumping plants, a total of 16 separate boosters are used to pump water stored in the
various storage tanks and into the distribution system. All boosters are vertical turbine type pumps
with the exception of boosters 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6 which are split case horizontal pumps. There are
also three boosters at Pumping Plant 4 which will be eliminated along with the tanks in FY 98-99.
Two of the boosters, 2-3 and 3-5, have large died engines that are designed to power the pumps in
the event of an electrical failure. These engines, while dating from the 1940's, were recently
overhauled and were determined to be in proper operating condition. However, the design of these
engines does not permit remote operation of the engines. In the event of a power failure, a trained
staff member must travel to the site and start the engines manually.
Distribution System
The distribution system in the City of Vernon operates as a single pressure zone system. That is, the
city's water pressure is determined by the height of the water in the single elevated tank. Since the
northwest corner of the city is some 20 feet in elevation higher than the southeast portion of the city,
the pressure at the high point is, on average, 8 to 9 pounds per square inch (PSI) lower than the
pressure at the low point. The average pressure in the distribution system is about 75 PSI.
The water mains in the city are all`cast iron pipes with cement linings to control corrosion. There
are a few exceptions, with the Central Manufacturing District (CMD) area being the most notable.
The CMD area is located east of Downey Road and south of the LA River. The water system in the
CMD area was, until the early 1980's, all privately owned by Santa Fe Land Improvement, Inc. The
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 6
Exhibit "A"
design and installation of the mains does not conform to municipal standards. The depth of the
mains is not as deep, many of the mains are not cement lined, and the number and location of control
valves is less than desirable. Many of the service connections do not have adequate control valves
on the laterals from the mains.
Further complicating the problem in the CMD area is the lack of adequate drawings that accurately
reflect the system. The engineers who designed. the CMD system in the 1920's did not createplans
that could be updated easily as new services were connected. All information was on one large sheet
of vellum and the scale of the drawing is such that small details are lost.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 7
Exhibit "A"
There are a wide variety of hazards that face municipal water systems in Southern California. Some
of these hazards are purely localized while others can affect the entire region. According to the
American: Water Works Association (AW WA), there are seven major classes of hazards facing water
systems: earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, tsunamis, riots/vandalism/civil disorder, and
nuclear weapons effects'.
Earthquakes
The City of Vernon, being situated in the heart of the Los Angeles basin is clearly subject to
earthquakes. The city is in an area classified as Seismic Zone 4 by the International Conference of
Building Officials, the highest classification available. As recent history has demonstrated, there is
a very real threat of a major earthquake event occurring at any time.
Earthquakes can affect water systems in a number of different ways. Large scale movement of the
ground can cause water wells to fail due to crushing of the well casing or damage to the line shaft.
The above ground piping from the discharge of the well can also break due to differential movement
of the deep well with respect to equipment anchored on the surface. Finally, even if the well
survives the earthquake, the water quality may be degraded due to the effect of surface water seeping
through new cracks in the well seal or due to silt and sand being disrupted in the well itself.
The design of the well pump can make a difference in it's ability to survive an earthquake. Line
shaft pumps, with their long motor shafts and numerous bearings and bushings, are far more
susceptible to ground motion than submersible type pumps. If the above ground piping remains
intact, a submersible pump has a greater chance of survival during an earthquake.
Earthquakes can also cause significant damage to water storage facilities. Improperly supported or
anchored tanks can shift off of their foundations, causing breaks in the pipes that ultimately results
in a loss of the stored water. Water sloshing within tanks can impose upwards vertical loads on the
roofs of tanks, causing the roofs to be damaged. While an extremely rare event, elevated tanks have
IAgardy, Franklin J. and Ray, Arliss D. (1973), Emergency Planning For Water Utility
Management, American Water Works Association, New York
2Ballantyne, Donald B. (1994) Minimizing Earthquake Damage: A Guide for Water
Utilities, American Water Works Association, New York
31bid
4lbid
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 8
Exhibit "A"
also experienced failures ranging from damage to connecting pipes to complete collapse.
Booster pumps are subject to many of the same problems that affect wells during earthquakes. Line
shafts can be damaged and pipes can break. A booster can also be damaged by the loss of water to
the inlet of the pump due to a failure of the storage tank. These pumps are not designed to operate
without some minimum water pressureon the inlet side of the pump.
The distribution system often is the most noticeable element of the system to fail. The memorable
images of the simultaneous break in a gas main and a water main during the 1994 Northridge.
earthquake made headlines around the world. Aging piping systems can be severed by extreme
ground motions. These breaks can render a water system useless due to the rapid loss of pressure
and stored water.
Finally, one of the most common affects of a major earthquake is the loss of power. Many
emergency management professionals recommend that a given area affected by a largo earthquake
should be prepared to be without electrical power for a period of 72 hours following the event.
Without electrical power, a water utility is in serious trouble. With limited capacity, the elevated:
tank can only supply water for a short while following the loss of power.
Hurricanes
The City of Vernon, like all of Southern California, is very rarely threatened by hurricanes. From
time to time, hurricanes do travel up the coast from Mexico and make landfall in the United States.
However, the major wind damage, if any, from a hurricane of this type will be limited to the costal
areas. For this reason, this assessment will consider the hazard from hurricanes to be practically
zero.
Tornadoes
Again, while tornadoes have occurred in one farm or another in the Southern California area, the real
threat from tornadoes exists primarily in other parts of the country. The topography of the area,
combined with the typical weather patterns, is not particularly well suited for the formation of
tornadoes. This assessment will consider the hazard from tornadoes to be practically zero.
Floods
Flooding can be a major problem for water utilities. The devastating Midwestern floods of 1993
demonstrated that the placement of most water facilities near the water source often placed the
treatment plants in hazard's way. The City of Vernon is located in a 500 year flood zone as defined
by the United States Geological Survey. This means that the probability of a flood occurring in the
City of Vernon in any given year is one in five hundred. Observations of the level of water in the
Los Angeles River during recent storms would suggest that the probability is actually higher than
one in five hundred.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 9
Exhibit "A"
The Los Angeles River passes through the city, but is channelized by high concrete walls
throughout. When water in the river channel reaches very high levels, many of the storm drain
systems that channel away storm water will cease to function. This will create flooding in many
areas of the city, but primarily in areas near the river itself. There is a remote possibility of a
catastrophic flood caused by a structural failure of the walls of the river channel. In this event,
massive amounts of waxer would pour through the opening. The velocity of the water would be
unnaturally high due to the geometry of the river channel. The damage to the water system from this
type of event would be immense. This assessment will not attempt to mitigate the hazard from a
structural collapse of the river channel.
Flood waters from less catastrophic events can damage wells by allowing contaminated water to run
down well shafts inundated in water. This injection of surface water directly into the pristine aquifer
bypasses the natural filtering process that protects ground water. Many types of contaminants, from
bacteria and viruses to chemicals can render the well useless as a potable water supply.
Further, flooding normally disrupts electrical power to the affected area, thereby eliminating the
ability of the water utility to operate pumps and other electrical equipment. Even if the source of
the water remains intact, the loss of power can disrupt service in a severe manner.
Tsunamis
Since the City of Vernon is many miles from the nearest portion of the coast, the hazard presented
from tsunamis will be considered to be essentially zero.
Riots, Vandalism, and Civil Disorder
The civil disorder experienced in Los Angeles during the spring of 1992 demonstrated how fragile
the orderly conduct of life in Southern California has become. This type of disturbance can also
have profound impacts on water systems. From physical damage by looters and arsonists, to the
unwillingness of staff to enter the affected areas, many parts of a water system can become
unuseable at a time when they are needed the most.
When the seven hazard groups were defined by AWWA in 1973, terrorism was not considered to
be a real threat in the United States. Nearly 25 years later, terrorism in the United States has
emerged as a real and potentially deadly threat. From Oklahoma City, to the World Trade Center,
Americans have become painfully aware that it can happen here.
While there have been no major events of terrorists targeting water systems, the possible outcome
of a concerfed attempt by terrorists to damage water facilities is horrendous. Since people correctly
consider their tap water safe to dink, the intentional contamination of water supplies with any
number of chemicals or pathogenic organisms could cause widespread illness and even death.
Delivered right into the homes of their intended victims, formerly potable water could be used as a
vehicle by the terrorist to deliver his deadly intentions to the population.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 10
Exhibit "A"
Nuclear Weapons Effects
Again, this hazard category is somewhat dated. In 1973 there was a real and formidable threat of
nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Twenty five years later, that threat has all but disappeared. The
current expectation is that a nuclear attack will be a limited event carried out by terrorists. For this
reason, this assessment will consider the hazard presented by nuclear weapons to be practically zero.
Additional Hazards
While the AWWA may have conceived of a fairly complete list, there are two more hazards that
should be included in this assessment: loss of electrical power and communications system failure.
While these are not normally considered to be a hazard that can be compared to an earthquake, the
effects that these hazards can have on the water system can be equally disruptive.
Loss of Electrical Power
All water systems are heavily dependant on electricity to power the various pumps and motors
needed to keep system pressure at acceptable levels. The loss of power can cause a major problem.
As an example, on September 4,1997 a voltage sag that lasted less than 1/10 of a second caused all
the motors on all of the pumps in the water system to shun off. It took only about 15 minutes to
correct the problem and get the boosters running again, but during that time, the pressure in the waxer
system dropped nearly 50% to about 40 PSI. Had there been a simultaneous fire or main break, the
loss of pressure would have been more dramatic.
In response to the event of September 4,1997, an immediate mitigation step was taken. In order to
keep the computers that control the booster pumps operating during a voltage sag, an un-interruptible
power supply (UPS) system has been installed at Pumping Plant One. This system will not operate.
the large booster motors, but it will keep the motor controller from shutting down. The motor
controller was then programmed to wait until proper voltage has returned and then turn on the
boosters that were running at the time of the voltage problem. In this way, the System Operator can:
focus on the numerous other tasks required during a power failure. The elapsed time between the
return of proper voltage and the start of the first booster pump will be less than two minutes!
In the event of a persistent power outage, it is important that a source of water be operational. We
cannot rely upon the MWD connection, for there is no guarantee that the MWD line will not be
damaged during the event. In a regional event, the pumps providing pressure in the MWD line could
become disabled as well. For these reasons, the MWD connection cannot be relied upon as a backup
source of water.
Currently, when the power goes out, the System Operator has two options, do nothing and hope
power is restored before the pipes run dry, or dispatch someone to start up the emergency diesel
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page I l
Exhibit "A"
booster pumps. In most cases, the latter is chosen. However, in the event that the reservoirs serving
the diesel boosters are damaged during the event or if the power outage lasts lone enough to exhaust
the supply of water in the reservoirs, the diesel boosters are of no help.
Communication System Failure
Currently, all city field crews communicate using a standard radio system with one frequency for
all public works staff. While this system works well during ordinary workdays, it's limitations
become very clear when an emergency occurs. First, the radio frequency used by the City of Vernon
is shared by several other nearby agencies. These agencies have transmitters that are more powerful
than ours and our communications can be disrupted or "stepped on" when these other agencies
transmit at the same time.
A second problem has more to do with the nature of two way radio itself. If someone else is sending
a transmission on any given frequency, no one else can use the frequency until the other
communication ends (unless you have more power and "step on" the other user). When an
emergency occurs, there are dozens of people on the radio frantically sending information on damage
and power outages as well as commands from management to different crews.
The end result is a situation where those who wish to communicate are reduced to waiting for a
chance to jump in between someone else's transmission. Someone waiting for a reply from party
A may have to wait until parties B and C finish communicating before Party A can get a word in
edgewise. The voltage sag of September 4,1997 clearly demonstrated this problem; the dispatchers
at the control center spent many minutes trying to send a simple, yet crucial message to start the
diesel booster pumps.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 12
Exhibit "A'
COMPONENT VULNERABILITY
The relative vulnerability of each of the components of the City of Vernon water production and
distribution system varies depending on the type and location of the particular component, In this
section, each component will be evaluated and the hazards particular to that component will be
defined. Of the seven original hazards identified, only the three most likely to occur will be
investigated.
Wells
Well 11
Earthquake - The line shaft pump with above ground piping is subject to damage from
earthquakes. There is no backup electrical power at the site.
Flooding - Located at the City Hall facility, Well 11 is several feet above the upper rim of
the concrete channel of the LA River. Flooding should not be a problem here unless power
is disrupted by flooding in other areas.
Riots/Terrorism - Since the well head is located about 50 yards from the entrance to the
Police Department and is surrounded by a fence topped with barbed wire, this well should
be relatively immune from unauthorized access.
Well 12
Earthquake -The line shaft pump with above ground piping is subject to damage from.
earthquakes. There is no backup electrical power at the site.
Flooding. - This well is located relatively close to the LA River and could become subject to
flood waters.
Riots/Terrorism - Access to the site is controlled by fencing and locked gates. However, this
facility is located in an area that is normally unoccupied by city staff and obtaining
unauthorized entry would not be difficult.
Well 14
Earthquake -The line shaft pump with above ground piping is subject to damage from
earthquakes. There is no backup electrical power at the site.
Flooding - This well is located relatively close to the LA River and could become subject to
flood waters.
Riots/Terrorism - Access to the site is controlled by fencing and locked gates. This well is
located immediately adjacent to a fire station which is staffed 24 hours a day.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 13
Exhibit "A"
Well 15
Earthquake -The line shaft pump with above ground piping is subject to damage from
earthquakes. There is no backup electrical power at the site.
Flooding - This well is some distance from the LA River and should be immune from all but
the most epic of floods.
Riots/Terrorism - Access to the site is controlled by fencing and locked gates. This well is
located immediately city owned apartments in which members of the water crews reside.
Well 16
Earthquake - the Submersible pump and below ground piping make this well less susceptible
to damage from earthquakes.
Flooding - Located at the City Hall complex, this well is not in eminent danger from
flooding. However, the recessed vault that contains the wellhead could be damaged by flood
waters as low as six inches above the surrounding grade.
Riots/Terrorism - Access to this well is through a manholelocated some 75 feet from a
public sidewalk. While near the entrance to the police station, this manhole is susceptible
to unauthorized entry.
Well 17
Earthquake -The line shaft pump with above ground piping is subject to damage from
earthquakes. There is no backup electrical power at the site.
Flooding - This well is located relatively close to the LA River and could become subject to
flood waters.
Riots/Terrorism - Access to the site is controlled by fencing and locked gates. However, this
facility is located in an area that is normally unoccupied by city staff and obtaining
unauthorized entry would not be difficult.
Well 18 -
Earthquakes - The submersible pump is less susceptible to damage from earthquakes, but the
large amount of above ground piping is susceptible to damage. In particular, the large sand
extraction tank could be damaged during an earthquake. There is no back up electrical power
at the site.
Flooding - This well is located well above the rim of LA River and is not subject to
damage from flooding..
RiotslTerrorism - Access to the site is controlled by fencing and locked gates. The site is on
a small street about one mile from City Hall that is normally unoccupied by city staff:
Unauthorized entry would not be difficult.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 14
Exhibit "A"
Well 19
Earthquake -The line shaft pump with above ground piping is subject to damage from
earthquakes. There is no backup electrical power at the site.
Flooding - This well is located some distance from the LA River and should be immune from
damage from flooding.
Riots/Terrorism - Riots/Terrorism - Access to the site is controlled by fencing and locked
gates. However, this facility is located in an area that is normally unoccupied by city staff
and obtaining unauthorized entry would not be difficult.
Well 20
Earthquake -The line shaft pump with above ground piping is subject to damage from
earthquakes. There is no backup electrical power at the site.
Flooding - This well is located close to the LA River and could become subject to flood
waters.
Riots/Terrorism Access to the site is controlled by fencing and locked gates. However, this
facility is located in an area that is normally unoccupied by city staff and obtaining
unauthorized entry would not be difficult.
Pumping Plants and Reservoirs
Pumping Plant One
Earthquake - The reservoir is of below grade concrete construction with a two story parking
structure above. While it was designed in the 1970's and should be capable of resisting the
force of an earthquake without collapsing, small cracks and gaps could develop that can lead
to contamination of the stored water. The booster pumps are line shaft pumps with a shaft
length of about 40 feet. These pumps are susceptible to earthquake damage to the shafts as
well as the above ground piping connected to the pumps. There is no back up electrical
power to the site.
Flooding - The Pumping Plant is located at the City Hall facility and should be high enough
to be safe from flooding. However, there is a grade level entrance to the reservoir that could
allow flood waters of only a few inches above surrounding grade to enter the reservoir.
Riots/Terrorism - Access to the site is controlled by fences and locking gates. The police
station and a fie station are both adjacent to the reservoir and are staffed 24 hours a day.
Pumping Plant Two
Earthquakes - There are two different sections to Pumping Plant 2 called Pumping Plant Two
and Pump House Two. Pump House Two was constructed in the 193Ws and contains three
booster pumps of split case design. The boosters are relatively safe from damage but the
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 15
Exhibit "A'
building itself was constructed prior to strict earthquake requirements in the building code.
Pumping Plant Two has two line shaft pumps of about 5 feet in length. These short pumps
are not as susceptible to earthquakes as the longer variety. There is one booster powered by
a diesel motor and is capable of operating without electrical power.
Flooding - Pumping House Two is located near the river and the pumps are located below
the street level. This facility is subject to damage from flooding. Pumping Plant Two is
somewhat farther away from the river and is less susceptible.
Riots/Terrorism - Access to the site is controlled by fencing and locked gates. However, this
facility is located in an area that is normally unoccupied by city staff and obtaining
unauthorized entry would not be difficult.
Pumping Plant Three
Earthquakes - This plant consists of five short line shaft pumps. While the pumps
themselves may be less susceptible to damage, the large amount of above ground piping has
the potential for damage. There is one booster powered by a diesel motor and is capable of
operating without electrical power.
Flooding This plant is located some distance from the river and should be high enough to
be safe from flood waters.
Riots/Terrorism - This plant is protected by fences and locked gates and is located adjacent
to a fire station and several city owned houses that house some water department staff. There
is the possibility for unauthorized access because of the large size of the site, regardless of
the adjacent housing and fire station.
Elevated Tank
Earthquake - This tank is the most vulnerable to earthquake due to the over 6 million pounds
of water suspended over 150 feet in the air. The piping that connects the tank to the
distribution system is subject to damage.
Flooding - While this tank is adjacent to the river, it's great height makes it an unlikely
victim of floods, except for structural subsidence due to saturated soils.
Riots/Terrorism - This tank is protected by fences and locked gates and is located adjacent
to a fire station that is staffed 24 hours a day.
The various vulnerabilities are summarized below:
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 16
Exhibit "A"
Table 2: Comnonent Vulnerabilities
Site
Earthquakes
Flooding
Dania a
Riots/ Terrorism
Backup
Power
Pump
Dania a
Piping
Dam a
Structure
Damage
Access
Control
rSite
Su 'sign
Well 11
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Well12
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Well14
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Well15
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Well16
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Well17
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Well18
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Well19
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Well20
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
PP 1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
PP2
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
partial
PP3
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
partial
partial
Elevated
Tank
N/A
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
N/A
Distribution
System
N/A
Yes
N/A
N/A
No
N/A
NIA
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 17
Exhibit "A"
HAZARD MITIGATION
Now that the various hazards have been identified, and the degree that each of these hazards affects
the different components of the water system, the process of identifying cost effective mitigation
strategies can move forward. Mitigation of hazards must take into account the true nature and
probability of the hazard along with the potential for disruption of the water system if a component
is taken out of service because mitigation measures were not applied.
Every component does not need to be protected against every hazard. One of the fortunate aspects
of the design of the City of Vernon water system is the fact that there are many different types.of
equipment located in several areas of the city. This separation of assets should provide a certain
measure of redundancy in the event that one or more facilities are disabled during an emergency.
However, the water system is a critical lifeline utility, without which serious fire hazards and
sanitation problems would arise. It is critical that every effort be made to keep as much of the assets
operating as possible. The loss of any significant proportion of pumping capacity can quickly lead
to the inability to meet water demands.
There are two main typesofmitigation efforts, structural and non-structural. Structural mitigation
efforts involve the physical construction of devices and/or structures that are designed to mitigate
the effects of a particular hazard. Earthquake reinforcement is a good example of structural
mitigation. Non-structural mitigation involves designing process and/or procedures by which.
hazards can be avoided altogether. Planning for new facilities to be located away from flood plains
is an example of non-structural hazard mitigation.
Another example of non-structural mitigation is training and communications. Planning for dealing
with emergencies and thorough training of the responding crews can make the difference between
an effective response and a confused 'response that merely makes the problem worse.
Communications between responders during an emergency is also critical. If right people are
not supplied with the right information in a timely manner, they will be incapable of performing their
dutiesinany efficient manner.
The Cost Benefits of Mitigation
While water is essential to life, at a retail level it is very inexpensive. One hundred cubic feet of
water (748 Gallons) costs just $0.806 in Vernon. The average well produces about $1800.00 worth
of water per day. If a cost benefit analysis of mitigation was performed based solely on the retail
value of the water, the result would be very little mitigation.
However, the true value of the water must be measured in terms of the amount of money that would
be lost if the system failed. With annual economic output that is measured in the billions of dollars,
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 18
Exhibit "A"
every day that the industrial customers of Vernon cannot operate due to a lack of water can cost
millions. The lost production has an economic ripple effect in surrounding communities as
thousands of hourly workers cannot earn their wages.
Of the utmost importance is the possibility of devastating losses due to fires. Without adequate
water supplies, even small fires can become devastating infernos. The City of Vernon Fire
Department has a Class 1 rating from Insurance Service Office, the highest rating available. Part of
the qualification for this rating stems from the reliability of the water system. Any failure of the
water system can result in countless millions in fire related losses.
Therefore, when considering the cost of an individual mitigation measure, it is important to
remember the possible consequences if the mitigation measure is not implemented. All of the
mitigation measures recommended in this report are very inexpensive in comparison to the potential
losses. The cost of these measures can be readily absorbed into the normal capital improvement
budget of the Water Department. The following structural mitigation measures are recommended
for the following components:
Wells
In order to better resist differential ground movement and to protect above ground piping
from failure during earthquakes, each well should be fitted with some sort of flexible
coupling that will allow both expansion and contraction as well as angular deflections. An
example of this type of coupling is attached.
The sand extraction tanks at wells 14 and 18 should be analyzed by a licensed structural
engineer in order to determine if the foundations for these tanks is sufficient to resist
earthquake forces.
Boosters
Vertical line shaft boosters should be fitted with flexible couplings of the type described
above. This is especially critical at Primping Plant One where the boosters have much longer
line shads.
The structure of Pump House Two should be analyzed by a licensed structural engineer to
determine if it is capable of resisting earthquake forces.
Reservoirs
The ground level opening at Reservoir 1 should be provided with some sort of retaining wall
in order to eliminate the possibility of surface water contamination of the potable water
stored in the reservoir.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 19
Exhibit "A"
All of the above ground reservoirs should be analyzed by a licensed structural engineer to
determine if they are capable of resisting earthquake farces. Special attention should be paid
to both lateral forces from the ground movement as well as the vertical forces on the roof
caused by water movement within the tank.
The outlets of the above ground reservoirs should be fitted with flexible connectors such as
those described above at the point where the tank outfall connects to below ground piping.
This should allow the tank to experience much greater differential movement without failure
of the pipe.
The elevated tank poses an additional concern. If this tank is damaged so that it must be
taken out of service, the entire distribution system could be damaged by excessive water
pressures that will be created when water supply exceeds water demand. In order to relieve
these excessive pressures, it is recommended that several pressure relief valves be installed
in different areas of the distribution system. These valves will bleed off excessive water
pressure and prevent system damage
Distribution System
In the event of an earthquake, it is expected that there will be breaks in some water mains,
especially in the older CMD area. In order to effectively identify how to control these main
breaks, each main line gate valve should be numbered and tagged for rapid identification in
the field. A master list of valves and the sections that they control should be kept on file
with all important crews as well as the dispatch center. In this way, even inexperienced
members of the staff can be guided through the proper procedures of closing off a section of
the water system.
If the water mains are broken in an emergency, it is important that the main be properly
disinfected prior to reriuning to service. Before the city discontinued the use of gas chlorine
for safety reasons, a portable gas- chlorinator was used for this purpose. Currently, an
inadequate sodium hypochlonte pump is the only method available. There are several
systems designed for using sodium hypochlorite to disinfect mains that cost less than
$2000.00. It is imperative that one of these systems be obtained along with a dechlorination
system that will remove the chlorine from the main when flushing.
Back up Power
It is recommended that new backup emergency generators be installed at wells 16,18, 19,
and'20 as well as at Booster Plant One. The reason that Booster Plant One and Well 16 are
'This process is now under way - the tags are to be delivered in early December and
should be installed by mid March.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 20
Exhibit "A"
to be kept operational is that these facilities serve the City Hall facility which also houses the
Emergency Operations Center (EOC). It is important that the EOC be keptoperational
during any forecast emergency. Well 16 was chosen over Well 11 because it has a
submersible pump design and no above ground piping and is thereby less susceptible to
earthquake damage.
These emergency backup generators cost about $50,000.00 each. This may seem like a lot
of money, but the cost of having no water in the mains is much, much greater. By placing
these generators at different locations around the city and powering wells that pump directly
to the system, we can reliably assume that at least one of these wells will survive an
earthquake and that a constant source of water is assured.
Communications Systems
It is recommended that the feasibility of altering the communications system be investigated.
New digital technologies are advancing rapidly and many more options are available. A
digital radio system that allows all parties to broadcast to individuals or groups of individuals
is offered by one national cellular company. This type of system would allow everyone to
communicate as needed without having to wait for a chance to talk between other
conversations. While the cost of this system is expected to be about $15,000.00 in hardware
and about $12,000.00 per year in air time costs, the exponential increase in the ability to
communicate in emergencies will provide a benefit that easily outweighs the costs. In fact
the annual cost of this system is a small fraction of one percent of the total Water Department
budget.
All Facilities
The security of the water system is only as good as the security at the water production and
storage sites. It is recommended that additional measures be added to all sites to prevent
unauthorized access. One possible mitigation measure is to install video surveillance
cameras in each site so that these sites can be remotely monitored. Another measure could
be to install systems that will detect if a gate is opened and sound an alarm in the Control
Center. New digital cameras can perform both duties. These cameras can display a video
image of the site in a remote location and detect when a person or vehicle comes into the
field of view.
Another possibility is the combined use of video surveillance cameras and infra -red motion
detectors. At a significantly lower cost, these systems can perform much the same function
of the new digital camera systems. It is recommended that a security system company be
consulted to determine the range of products offered on the market.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 21
Exhibit "A"
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
As mentioned in the introduction, these two elements of the Emergency Management Plan are
covered by a separate document, the City of Vernon Emergency Operations Plan. This document
is not a replacement of this existing plan. There are, however, several items that should be included
in the next revision of the Emergency Operations Plan.
Main Break Response
The existing Emergency Operations Plan does not contain an element that describes the proper
methods of controlling a break in a water main. Main breaks are a common result of vigorous
ground movement during an earthquake. Main breaks are also caused by the careless actions of
contractors who dig in the streets. Since main breaks cause a dramatic drop in system pressure, it
is critical that they be controlled as quickly as possible.
There is, however, an additional hazard that can be introduced as a result of the improper response
to a main break. Water mains are pressurized systems, and when a line is broken, the contents of
the system spill out of the crack into the surrounding soil. The surrounding soil is at best dirty, and
can contain any number of pathogenic organisms from sewer leaks or other sources. During most
moderate breaks, the system pressure is enough to keep these organisms from entering the water
main.
If the responder closes all of the valves that control the broken section, the pressure in that section
falls off rapidly and the soil surrounding the pipe, along with any pathogenic organisms, is allowed
into the pipe. Further, the service connections into the industrial buildings of Vernon then drain their
contents into the main as well. If a service has an unprotected connection (no backflow protection),
chemicals and other substances can be siphoned into the water main. Both of these conditions can
cause illness or worse if ingested after the repairs are complete.
For these reasons, it is important to keep pressure in the main at all times. The control valves can
be operated, but just to the point where the loss of water is reduced substantially without losing
system pressure. If a section of main must be shut down completely, all services connected to that
section must be shut off prior to the shutdown of the main. This will prevent the siphonage of
undesirable materials from the service connections.
Another problem with the control of main breaks is the identification of the proper control valves,
especially in the CMD area. As described in the mitigation element of this report, a stainless steel
tag with the valve number of each main line valve is in the process of being affixed next to each
valve. Once this is complete, a description of the control valves for every individual block of the
city will be produced and distributed.
A response guideline, written in the format of the Emergency Operations Plan has been developed
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 22
Exhibit "A"
and is included in Appendix B.
Water Facilities Damage Assessment
The Emergency Operations Plan does not specify the steps to be taken in the aftermath of an
emergency such as an earthquake with regards to damage assessment Since the continued provision
of water for fire protection and sanitation is the primary objective of the Water Department, the
condition of the sources of this water is of great importance.
After every seismic event, large and small, a competent person must make a visual assessment of
damage at all water facilities. Of course, if major damage has occurred, the System Operator will
be given indication of the damage through the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
system. Water levels in reservoirs, flow rates, and pressures are transmitted continuously to the
control center. Abnormal reading in any of these parameters indicates.a problem.
There could be damage to a facility that is not detected by SCADA.. Wells could continue to operate
for a short time with damaged bearings and shafts. It is important to identify these sorts of problems
so that they can be corrected before more serious damage is done. For these reasons, the Systems
Operator shall dispatch a competent person to survey the equipment A guidance for the response
is included in Appendix B.
Emergency Supply Vendor List
The Emergency Operations Plan does not contain a comprehensive list of vendors that can provide
crucial services during and emergency situation. The rapid procurement of necessary repair
equipment and supplies is pivotal in the success of the response effort. An extremely good resource
for this list is contained in the Basin wide Emergency Response Plan that has been developed by the
Central Basin Municipal Water District (CBMWD). This document contains not only a list of
vendors, but also provides information on resources that other water agencies in the area can provide.
While no specific Mutual Aid agreement is in effect at this time, water agencies have traditionally
been willing to help in any way that they can during emergency situations. A copy of this list is on
file at City Hall and is updated annually by CBMWD.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 23
Exhibit "A"
IR"E"c0VERY
Once the response phase of an emergency response is completed, the recovery phase begins. In fact,
in many ways, these two phases overlap. The recovery phases often determines the actual extent of
damages by making sure that the situation returns to normal as quickly as possible. Some recovery
efforts must begin well before the end of the response phase.
The disruption of water service is one of the primary reasons for business disruption after an
emergency. Without water, most businesses cannot provide the level of sanitation or service that
is required. If any portion of the water system is shut down in an emergency, the rapid return of that
portion of the system to operation is critical.
Temporary Emergency Water Suppty
In the event of a major disaster, the entire water system could be rendered inoperable. In this most
serious of conditions, the immediate concern is to provide some sort of source of safe drinking water
for those people who remain in Vernon. We cannot assume that help will be available from outside.
There are several ways to provide this water. If any of the storage tanks survive the event intact,
they will contain at least 600,000 gallons of chlorinated water that is ready to distribute. There are
small taps on the sides of the tanks that can be used for dispensing the water into containers for
distribution Residents and others who are in need of water would: bring their own containers to the
distribution area. A small number of containers could be provided for those without any means of
transporting the water.
If the storage tanks, wells, and MWD connection do not survive the initial event, there are precious
few options available. In this situation, there will be no water source available in the city. Water
will have to be trucked in from outside the city limits. In this drastic event, we will be dependant
on outside agencies for assistance and whether or not that assistance will be readily available is
another question entirely.
One option is to establish an agreement with a local supplier of bottled water to provide an
emergency supply of water to be distributed in the city. However, in an event severe enough to
disable all of our water resources,, it is unlikely that the local supplier will be able to produce water
either. If some water is available "on the shelves", it will certainly be in great demand and in very
short supply.
For these reasons, the source of water during large scale emergencies must be internal to the city.
Once we have reliable back up power systems at several well sites, we can pump a large amount of
water into the system. This will require that the system is capable of accepting the water. If there
are multiple main breaks, the affected areas must be isolated so that the remaining portions of the
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 24
Exhibit "A"
system can be pressurized. Well 19 can pump directly to the reservoirs at Pumping Plant Three if
necessary, assuming that one or more reservoirs is intact.
Boil Water Orders
After a large scale disruption of the water system, there are a large number of sources of
contamination that can enter the water system. Main breaks, reservoir damage, and well disruption
can all create a situation where the safety of the water in such a compromised system will not be
assured. The distribution of this water under these conditions must be accompanied by a boil water
order until bacteriological testing can be conducted.
Due to the relatively small area of Vernon, this boil water alert will be broadcast by loudspeakers.
on Police and Fire Department vehicles. Additional alerts will be forwarded to other medial outlets
such as radio and television, but the primary notification will be by means of verbal communication.
All water customers will be advised to boil their water prior to consumption for at least 10 minutes.
The boil water order will be lifted at such time that bacteriological testing confirms that there are no
pathogenic organisms present in the water system.
Large Water Users
It is expected that the water system may not be able to operate at full capacity for some period of
time after a large emergency. The total amount of water available at any given time will be reduced
substantially. In this situation it may become necessary to restrict the use of water by some of the
larger water users within the city. Fully 50% of the water distributed to over 1500 customers is
consumed by the 10 largest users. If these companies restrict their use, it will reduce the total system
demand significantly. Customer Services updates the list showing the largest water users monthly.
This list will be used to determine which companies will be asked to reduce their operations. If a
customer refuses to reduce consumption, and this excessive use creates a condition where water is
not available in sufficient quantity for other uses, that customer will be disconnected from the water
system.
In a major event that causes significant damage to water storage and pumping facilities, the repair
of the system could take many weeks. While limited water service will be available, the return to
full scale operations will be dependant on the nature of the damage. The largest water users may
have to curtail operations for an extended time. Every effort should be made to encourage these
users to make changes in productions, such as changing work schedules to off peak hours, so that
they can remain in business without causing serious problems in the water system during the
recovery phase. Once operations return to normal, the restrictions on use can be removed.
City of Vernon Water Department Emergency Management Plan Page 25
Exhibit "A"
APPENDIX B
FIRST RESPONDER GUIDE FOR:
Water System Damage Assessment
1. Contact the System Operator to determine if any facilities have
I been severely impacted.
2. After receiving instructions, drive to each well and booster
site in order to assess damage. Begin at City Hall with the
10MG reservoir and Pumping Plant 1. Check for signs of
cracking in the parking structure (from outside the structure).
Check for visible damage to the booster pumps. Report any
damage to the System Operator.
3. Proceed to the two wells on City Hall property (11 and 16).
Since well 16 has a submersible pump, the only way to check the
condition of the well is to open the manhole and check the
condition of the discharge piping. Well 11 is a line shaft
well and can be checked readily. For all line shaft wells,
check the following:
- Make sure the above ground piping is intact. Report any
cracks or breaks.
- Check the oil reservoir on the side of the motor for
oil. If it is empty, add oil.
- Check the motor and shaft for plumb,.if the motor seems
tilted report damage.
- Check the chlorine tanks and pump. Report any problems.
- If motor is running, report any unusual noises.
- Open water sample tap to check color and odor of water.
Report anything unusual.
4. Proceed to the next site on the direction of the System
Operator. At the above ground tanks, check the following:
- Check inlet and outlet piping for cracks and breaks.
- Check tanks for cracks, breaks, or unusual bulges in the
sides.
- Check level of water in tank. Verify that it matches
the SCADA reading.
5. At the elevated tank, check the following:
—Look for leaks, cracks, or broken lines.
- Check to see if tank is leaning.
- Check pressure reading at tank bottom (if safe to do so)
and verify the reading matches the SCADA read.
6. After assessing damage at all facilities, make a complete
report to the System Operator. Additional reports may be
required.
Exhibit "A"
11
FIRST RESPONDER GUIDE FOR:
Water Main Break
1. Put on your safety equipment, including reflective vest, name tag,
hard hat, gloves, and appropriate footwear.
2. Survey the scene to determine as closely as possible the section
of main that has broken.
3. Secure the area. Divert all traffic as necessary out of the
affected area. Place proper barricades and delineation as
required to create a safe work area.
4. Contact the dispatcher to obtain instructions on how to properly
control the break. If the dispatcher is not available, refer to
the instructions included with the materials distributed to all
water crews, stand by personnel, and the Fire Department. These
instructions will identify the valve numbers that will control the
main in the affected area.
5. Locate all of the valves identified in the instructions. Remove
manhole lids or valve riser caps. Place cones around the open
manholes to prevent falling injuries.
6. Establish one valve as the primary control valve. This valve is
to be operated last. Turn off all other valves identified in the
instructions. There could be as many as six valves to operate.
7. While watching the water flowing up from the broken main, slowly
turn the primary control valve. It sometimes takes several
seconds for the turning of the valve to have an effect on the rate
of the leak. After a few turns, stop and wait for at least 30
seconds and observe the rate of leakage. If there is no change,
turn the valve a few more turns and stop. DO NOT SHUT OFF THE
MAIN COMPLETELY! It may take several minutes to get the water to
slow down. The damage caused by a few more minutes of leaking
water is small in comparison to the potential damage from
contamination of the water supply.
8. Close the primary control valve until the rate of the leak has
been reduced significantly. Allow the small leak to continue
until repair crews can stop the leak. Divert the water away from
areas that may be damaged by the water.
9. If the main must be shut off completely, all services must be shut
off before the main is shut down.
10. In all cases, the main must be disinfected before being placed
back into service. This disinfection is to be applied by Water
Department personnel.
Exhibit "A'